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Abstract 
Against the background of the ECtHR's recent decision in Appleby v UK (a European “counterpart” to the well-known US 
Supreme Court decision in Marsh v Alabama) the paper addresses, first, the issue of the influence, often perceived as 
dilemmatic, of human rights norms and constitutional norms on private law. In a second step, then, the paper discusses the 
promise—and a possible dilemma—of “comparative constitutionalism” as an engine of a more denationalized 
“constitutional patriotism”: the dilemma that we trade the “closure” of domestic exceptionalism against the new, systemic 
“closure” of “too much” judicial comity and professionalism, the closure of a new Juristenrecht. 
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Burca, Daniela Caruso, Damian Chalmers, Hugh Collins and Joanne Scott for their generous comments. An earlier version of this paper 
was presented at the ELRC at Harvard Law School in October 2003. 
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I. The Invisible City
1 
 
Suppose you want to organize a demonstration in your local town center in order to protest against some 
local development plans of your municipality. If public officials ban your demonstration, say, because they dis-
agree with your message, you are in a position to invoke against such “state action” the right to freedom of ex-
pression – as guaranteed in Europe under Art. 10 ECHR. But suppose that the town center in its entirety has re-
cently been sold by the municipality to a private company, and it is now this company which, as legal owner of 
the town center, prevents you from speaking, all other things being equal.
2 (The area in question, let’s assume, is 
huge, with many shops and supermarkets, car parks and walkways: several important public services like the 
public library, the social service office, the health center and even the police station are located in or adjacent to 
the center, and there is an active presence of public agencies in the vicinity. But the privatized town center (eu-
phemistically called “the Galleries”) is, nevertheless, not co-extensive with the town itself.) In response to your 
complaint against the ban (you invoke Art. 10 ECHR and argue that the town center is a “quasi-public forum”), 
the owners point out to you that the area in question “… is unique in as much as although it is the Town Center, 
it is also privately owned.” They assure you that their “stance on all political and religious issues is one of strict 
neutrality” and that they are, in upholding their ban, “applying this philosophy.” In response to your insistence – 
ultimately before a constitutional court (in casu, the ECtHR) – that “the State owe[s] [you] a positive obligation to 
secure the exercise of [your] rights” within the “Galleries,” the State in question – the British Government – 
points out (among other things) that “it [is] not for the Court to prescribe the necessary content of domestic law 
by imposing some ill-defined concept of ‘quasi-public’ land to which a test of reasonableness can be applied.” 
(Call this the “hard-nosed claim.”) 
 
In this paper I want to address, against the background of the ECHR’s recent attempt to resolve the clash 
between property rights and the right to freedom of expression in its decision in Appleby v. UK, two questions – 
both of which I take to be related to the overarching theme of “social democracy” – first, the problem of the in-
fluence of “higher law” – of human rights norms and constitutional norms – on private law norms; second, the 
question of the role of adjudication in “constitutionalizing” private law, in other words, the question of the “judi-
cial cognizability” of constitutional norms within private law. 
 
Start with the question of why there is resistance against the idea that a private party may invoke funda-
mental rights against another non-state actor. Proponents of the view that the efficacy, or scope of application, of 
fundamental rights should be confined essentially to the dimension of correcting imbalances between the ex-
cesses of state power and individual liberty – of governing the relationship between the individual and the state – 
argue, on both substantive and non-substantive grounds, that only through such a containment legal implications 
remain predictable. Any extension of fundamental rights between non-state actors – by requiring the “balancing” 
between the fundamental rights of individuals as rights-bearers – would  
 
(i)  result (if carried to its logical endpoint) in a sweeping judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives 
and, concomittantly, in a threat to private law’s libertarian core of liberal autonomy and experimentalism – think 
of liberal autonomy as a sphere of decision making according to your own criteria of the right and the good, not 
the public’s (as second-guessed by the courts); 
 
(ii)  and would make “private law” – understood as a shorthand for a relatively insulated (against politi-
cal conflict), freestanding (with regard to moral diversity), insistently analogical and incremental method of rea-
soning and of doctrinal accretion that avoids abstractions and conflicts between first-order principles – redundant 
and superfluous.  
 
 
                                                           
1 With apologies to Italo Calvino. 
2 These were the facts in the European Court of Human Rights’ recent decision in Case of Appleby and Others v. The United Kingdom 
(Application no. 44306/98 [2003]).   3
The idea of a “constitutionalization of private law,” however attractive looking in a constellation char-
acterized by privatization and denationalization, seems to leave us with a dilemma: on the one hand, if you ac-
cept the idea that constitutional rights are protected liberty- and integrity-interests and that as such they have the 
dimensions of magnitude and value,
3 then what matters constitutionally is the menace itself to liberty- and 
integrity-interests, regardless of its provenance (i.e., of whether it stems from “state action” or “private action,” 
and of whether it reflects a “vulnerability” [as a consequence of a harmful exposure of yours to society] or a 
“need” of yours for protection by the State). But on the other hand, the two reasons I mentioned – the concerns 
with liberal autonomy and with judicial cognizability of open-ended constitutional norms in need of “balancing” 
– account for the resistance against the collapse of the separation between constitutional law and private law (the 
concern being that notions of value and magnitude are inherently boundless or without “a logical endpoint”
4). To 
the extent that you are under the sway of the resistance-thesis, then, the maintenance of a separation between 
both orders of norms will appear to you to be constitutionally mandated, however paradoxical that may appear 
from the internal standpoint that rights are protected interests, and the “constitutionalization of private law” will 
strike you as a self-defeating enterprise. 
 
This paper’s project is to show, with specific reference to the conflict (underlying Appleby) between 
property rights and rights to freedom of expression, that there is no such dilemma: I will suggest (by way of a 
largely critical discussion of the ECtHR’s decision in Appleby, in which the Court ruled that the owners’ property 
interests must take precedence over the applicants’ communicative interests) that the expressive liberties at stake 
give rise to a “protective function”
5 of the state – the United Kingdom – to (re-)design common law rules of pri-
vate property in such a way that the “fair value” of political speech can be realized in the given setting. I will 
also suggest that the “constitutionalization” of relevant chunks of property law does not put demands on consti-
tutional adjudication (demands in terms of the judicial cognizability of protection-worthy expressive interests 
and in terms of the “protective function’s” judicial administrability) that the constitutional adjudication is not in 
a position to meet – in other words, I will submit that cognizability-problems are less troublesome or intractable 
than is often claimed by defenders of constitutional neoformalism or constitutional pragmatism.  
 
Generalizing, then, beyond the issues in Appleby, and in an attempt to understand the larger lessons with 
regard to the question “What Constitutions can do,”
6 I will suggest that we can distinguish between three mutu-
ally controlling aspects of the role constitutions play with regard to private law. Let’s say, then, that a role of 
constitutions is 
 
  not merely to entrench a libertarian core of individual liberty spheres – of “subjective rights” – 
against the state; nor merely to provide the state with action-guiding “objective principles” or maxims for a “ho-
listic” constitutional ordering of private law relations and of social spheres, but rather to insure that rights (such 
as, in casu, freedom of expression) that can be invoked in order to disentrench existing (exclusionary) private-
law practices. The emphasis here is on the “unlocking”
7 or transformative and contextualizing role of the Con-
stitution with regard to private law: the role of creating an ongoing “reflective disequilibrium”
8 between private-
law norms and constitutional counternorms, and thus of insuring that the state, in defining the situation-specific 
                                                           
3 F. Michelman, “Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method,” in: G. Stone, R. Epstein and C. Sunstein, The Bill of Rights in the 
Modern State (Chicago 1992), with reference to J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1972). 
4 On the idea of a logical endpoint, cf. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision 
Grutter v Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, at 2347 (2003). 
5 On the idea of a protective function, see now F. Michelman, “The Protective Function of the State in Constitutional Law” (Preliminary 
Draft Aug. 2003). “Protective function” is a direct translation of the terminus technicus in German constitutional law of “Schutz-
funktion.” 
6 The title of my paper is, of course, prompted by the subtitle of Cass Sunstein’s book: Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do 
(OUP, 2001). 
7 On “unlocking,” cf. Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy (op. cit.), p. 230 (quoting the South-African Constitutional Court’s important 
Grootboom case). 
8 On the idea of reflective disequilibrium (which, evidently, draws on Rawls’s notion of a reflective equilibrium), cf. O. Gerstenberg/ 
Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal for Europe? [AEL-volume, OUP 2002]   4
scope and contours of its “protective function,” does not act until diverse people have had an opportunity to con-
sult with each other and to listen to one another's arguments; 
 
  not, quasi “fatalistically,” to empower the courts at democracy’s expense, but rather (and only prima 
facie surprisingly) to weaken judicial finality by providing a framework for a non-court-centric multi-level proc-
ess of public discussion over constitutional settlements, and, thus, by confining constitutional adjudication to a 
“subsidiary role”
9 in the process of constitutional ordering: on the one hand, judges must take into account which 
view of moral rights actually is, as a matter of substance, the better view.
10 (Thus, the recommendation that 
moral rights that properly are “cognizable” – or may figure – within judicial decisions are those that, as a matter 
of fact, recognized in a given private law system (facts of authorship or social acceptance as “sources” of law) 
seems less helpful as a response to the “circumstances of constitutional justice”
11 – the open-endedness of consti-
tutional norms and the fact of reasonable interpretive pluralism.
12) But on the other hand, the idea of disentrench-
ment implies a role of adjudication as a “trigger” of public deliberation – as a trigger for the process of “reflec-
tive disequilibrium” to unfold, and ultimately for the state’s legislative development of its “protective function” 
with regard to citizens. (Think of this as a “democracy-encouraging” role of the constitution); 
 
  to lay the ground for a more denationalized “constitutional patriotism” which will lend credibility to 
the role of the ECtHR bindingly to interpret a Bill of Rights – and, hence, to its moral authority, as a supranational 
“constitutional court,” to disrupt domestic private-law routines whenever there is reason to fear that these rou-
tines lapse into exceptionalism and closure – and to the Court’s capacity to generate, through the respect-
worthiness, in terms of substantive morality, of its case-law, its own souces of public allegiance. 
 
In a first step, I will discuss the relationship between constitutional law and private law more generally. 
One aim of mine here is to challenge the related doctrines of Drittwirkung and of inclusive positivism, which – 
as I will argue – frame the problem of the interrelation between constitutional law and private law in inadequate 
terms. 
 
In a second step, I will discuss the Court’s decision in Appleby. I will argue that in giving, in casu, pre-
cedence to the owners’ property rights, the Court (despite some of its formulations in the decision to the con-
trary) failed to understand the importance and role of political speech as a prerequisite to a “functioning democ-
racy,” and failed to understand the constitutional challenge posed by privatization. 
 
I will conclude with the suggestion to dissociate the analysis of a legal system’s protective function from 
the broader discussion about social democracy. 
 
II. Constitutional Law and Private Law 
 
Imagine a constitutional regime which includes a Bill of Rights and which also includes, among its 
structural provisions, a secondary norm “Z,” according to which the Bill of Rights “shall bind the legislature, the 
executive, and the judiciary as directly enforceable law.”
13 Proceeding from Z one might argue that, as a matter 
of simple textual command, constitutional rights have no binding effect on private individuals, but only on the 
state and its organs: constitutional rights draw a boundary between “state” and “society” – and “around” a sphere 
of individual sovereignty and integrity of the person; constitutional rights operate as a form of collective self-
restriction (or as a “calculus of distrust”) by excluding certain irresolvably contentious and emotionally charged 
                                                           
9 Thus the ECtHR’s emphasis in Hatton and Others v The United Kingdom from the 08. July 2003. 
10 This emphasis is, of course, both Dworkinian and Rawlsian. For a recent restatement by Dworkin, cf. his Response to overseas com-
mentators, in I.CON 651 ff. (2003). 
11 I am here, of course, building on Rawls’s notion of the “circumstances of justice.” 
12 Equally, the familiar idea that all what is required is a “balancing” of rights seems inadequate, as this idea suggests that what is at issue 
is merely to find a compromise between competing policies (as opposed to rights). 
13 Compare Art. 1 III of the German Grundgesetz (“GG”) with the second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. Cf. also Art. 8 (1) of the Constitution of South Africa (1996): “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the leg-
islature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state.”   5
issues from the public agenda. By contrast, the relationships between private individuals lie, in this scenario, out-
side the “normal” purview of constitutionalism; they are governed by “private law” as a conceptually distinct 
category, and with its own aspiration to coherence.
14 
 
Of course, private law, if it is to determine the relationship between private individuals, must be com-
patible with the constitution, but this compatibility-requirement will always already be satisfied, in the scenario I 
am asking you to imagine, as long as the overall constitutionality of the process, which brought existing private 
law about (either by explicit legislation or by permitting its evolutionary growth through “practice”), is certain. 
Thus there is, in this scenario, a clear separation between legislation and adjudication: problems of constitutional 
interpretation are part of the former (legislation), but they can’t conceivably arise in the adjudicative process of 
private law application. Call this the “separability-thesis.” 
 
Notice now that it is, of course, “child’s play” to make the “simple, Hohfeldian point” that “the state, as 
the sovereign source of the common law, is responsible for every failure of the common law to provide relief 
against one or another exercise of power by one member of society against another.”
15 In other words, Z can al-
ways be taken to imply that (i) private law and the relationships between private individuals do not remain out-
side the range of constitutional law, but are “always already” determined by underlying constitutional values 
such as fairness and democracy; and that (ii) all rules and standards of private law must, pervasively and without 
exception, be interpreted in the light of those values. Thus, the implication of the “simple, Hohfeldian point” is 
twofold (or “complex”): first, horizontal private-law relationships would, rather than being “exceptionalized,” 
“continuum-ized” with the constitution (what matters, is the vulnerability itself, not where it comes from, its 
provenance, in conventional terms of “public” and “private”); second, the clear-cut separation between legisla-
tion and adjudication – what I called the “separability-thesis” – collapses: if constitutional rights have a direct 
binding effect on private individuals, and if constitutional law has an immediate impact on private law, then con-
stitutional courts (“adjudication”) become “fora of principle” in the strongest possible sense. As constitutional 
rights and essentials take on the practical dimensions of magnitude and value, and as their value is “intrinsic” 
(i.e. conducive to the fulfillment of certain liberty- and integrity-interests of persons), as opposed to merely “in-
strumental” (as delimiting state action and casting a constraint over public decision making), adjudication must 
“harmonize” – construct transitory orders between – highly abstract and open-ended principles in a process 
which must be continually reviewed. But the collapse of the separability-thesis (because both parties to a conflict 
can now invoke fundamental rights) immediately gives rise to the concerns (mentioned above): that, first, private 
autonomy is under menace; second, that private law becomes “superfluous.” If both parties can invoke funda-
mental rights, then private law’s conventionality unravels and what I’ve dubbed the logics of insulation (of a 
sphere of private law against “politics”) breaks down. Private law becomes “superfluous.” 
 
The simple Hohfeldian point (I drop the quotation marks now) had been at the center of the well-known 
Lueth-decision
16 of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht.  
 
The Lueth case began as a torts case: at issue was the private law rule of section 826 of the German Civil 
Code (“BGB”) which requires someone who has harmed another person “intentionally and in a manner contrary 
to good morals” to compensate that person for the damage that results; read together with the injunction in sec-
tion 1004 of the BGB, this rule grants the person who has suffered harm the right to have the tort-feasor ordered 
                                                           
14 Duncan Kennedy on “Classical Legal Thought” and legal formalism: “Legal Formalism,” in N.J. Smelser/P.B. Baltes, eds., Encyclo-
pedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier 2001); idem, “Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850 – 1968,” in: 36 
Suffolk University Law Review 631 ff. (2003); idem, “The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality or Max Weber’s soci-
ology in the genealogy of the contemporary mode of Western legal thought (Ms. 2002).” 
15 F. Michelman, “W(h)ither the Constitution?” 21 Cardozo Law Review, 1063 ff, at 1076 (2000). 
16 BVerfGE 7, 198. There is, of course, more than ample literature on this case. The reconstructions I learned most from are: Friedrich 
Kuebler, “Lueth: eine sanfte Revolution” (BVerfGE 7, 198 ff), in: Kritische Vierteljahresschrift fuer Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissen-
schaft, p. 313 ff. (2001); Dieter Grimm, “The impact of Fundamental Rights on Private Law” (Ms. 1997, on file with Harvard Law 
School); idem, “Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts,” 48 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 1697 
ff. (1995).   6
to refrain from the conduct in question. How does freedom of expression, as guaranteed in Art. 5 of the German 
Grundgesetz, influence the reading of that private law provision? 
 
In 1950, Erich Lueth, the president of the Hamburg Press Club and a member of the society for German-
Jewish reconciliation, repeatedly publicly criticized Veit Harlan, who had, as producer of the anti-semitic film 
“Jud Suess,” been one of the most influential movie directors during the Third Reich, and who had resumed di-
recting movies in the Federal Republic. Lueth called upon distributors, cinema-owners and the public to boycott 
Harlan’s new tear-jerker “Immortal Beloved”; the film’s producer and distributor sought an injunction with the 
ordinary private law courts, effectively forcing Lueth to omit his call for boycott. Lueth was ordered to refrain 
from calling for a boycott in the future or else face a fine or imprisonment; according to the interpretation of 826 
given by the ordinary courts, any call for a boycott ipso facto violates this rule (because, that’s what the rule 
clearly says and intends to say). Thus, the conflict (or “clash”) in Lueth was one between property interests, on 
the one hand, and free speech values on the other. 
 
What the Constitutional Court famously did was to explain that the fundamental rights granted by the 
German Grundgesetz, such as freedom of expression, weren’t only “subjective rights” of the individual ad-
dressed (as barriers) against the state, but also, and at the same time, “objective principles for the whole legal 
and social order.” Thus – and the Court explicitly drew this conclusion from the idea of a so-called “objective” 
character of “subjective” rights – every private law provision, if it limits (or has a limiting effect) on a funda-
mental right, must be interpreted “in the light” of the fundamental right. What Lueth, then, discredited (in the 
German legal context) was the view that constitutional law governed only the “making” of private law, but not 
the “application” or “interpretation” of private law; in other words, what Lueth endorsed was the idea that there 
is no clear-cut separability between “justification” and “application”/“interpretation” of private law in a case like 
Lueth. The influence of constitutional law on private law does not “come to an end” with the “making” of pri-
vate law, but extends into the very process of its interpretation.  
 
On the other hand, however, the Court sought to limit and to discipline the influence of constitutional 
norms on private law norms and on what it took to be an open-ended process of “balancing” between clashing 
constitutional values – “open-ended,” because the Court also pointed out that there is no pre-established hierar-
chy (or harmony) between competing constitutional values and an order between them can only be established 
with regard to the specifics of context and situation. The self-limiting formula which the Court found (and which 
was to become highly influential in the international debate) was that the influence of constitutional norms on 
private law must be “mediated” by the interpretation of private law itself; this was called, in German constitu-
tional lingo, the mittelbare Drittwirkung, and has subsequently become known as indirect application. Thus, the 
solution to the problem of the open-endedness, and apparent indeterminacy, of constitutional balancing which 
the Court sought to develop in Lueth was one which would prevent civil courts from “freeing” themselves en-
tirely from the provisions of the Civil Code and from “balancing” competing constitutional values against each 
other by writing on a clean slate unconstrained by the provisions of private law. The Court, therefore, was eager 
to emphasize that the litigation, even if constitutional norms are invoked, remains one of private law, that the 
“balancing” between competing constitutional values takes place within the “private law framework,” and that it 
is the task of private law to create a fair balance when rights – such as property rights and freedom of expression 
– collide.  
 
The balancing between competing constitutional values, then, can occur (in the picture I am describing) 
only within the framework of private law, and in particular within (or “channelled by”) the general clauses of 
private law (such as “good morals”).
17 Thus, private law is said to retain some “autonomy” with regard to consti-
tutional law, as a limiting device with regard to constitutional “balancing,” and the problem then becomes, of 
course, to reconcile this with the idea of the supremacy of the constitution. An answer to the problem of judicial 
cognizability is attempted through the idea that rights (i) are directly effective as protections against the state, but 
                                                           
17 The standard metaphor is that of “permeation.” See Barak, “Constitutional Human Rights and Private Law.” In: Daniel Friedmann/ 
Daphne Barak-Erez, Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), at 29.    7
do not “directly” apply to private law disputes (and don’t bind “you” directly as a private actor), that (ii) the 
clash of constitutional values does not affect the character of the dispute as a private-law-dispute, and that (iii) 
constitutional law has only a “radiant effect” on private law and must be “mediated” through private law so as to 
become effective in the private sphere.  
 
Of course, it is easy (once again, “child's play,” you might say) to point out that you can’t have it both 
ways – constitutional supremacy and the idea that the impact of the constitution on private law is contingent 
upon private law itself as a self-sufficient, self-programming, “archimedian” set of legal norms and methods of 
reasoning. The concept of mediated Drittwirkung/indirect application is a strategy or method of avoiding the 
first-order conflict between constitutional values through emphasis on the normative coherence of the private 
law program and on the “autopoietic” character of the private law system which decides of its own – in its own 
spontaneity, as it were – when, under what conditions, and to which degree to “incorporate” constitutional val-
ues into its own fabric. But this archimedian view of private law stands in a permanently “conflicted” relation-
ship – if not unresolvable tension – to the role of constitutional law as higher law.
18  
 
Surprisingly, the idea of indirect application, which originated in Lueth, has set the stage for the contem-
porary debate. For example, Aharon Barak has advocated a model based on what he calls “strengthened indirect 
application.” This model has two features. On the one hand, individuals’ rights, such as the right to property, are, 
as Barak insists, rights of the private individual vis-à-vis both the government and other individuals;
19 the recog-
nition of the human rights of one person vis-à-vis another inevitably involves limitation and narrowing, as a 
consequence of the regard for the other’s right.
20 On the other hand, this limitation and narrowing must be evalu-
ated within the particular normative framework of private law. Private law is, as he puts it, “the ‘geometric loca-
tion’ for formulating remedies for an infringement by one private individual on the constitutional right of an 
other individual.” The party must find its relief within the framework of private law. To the extent that private 
law does not, despite the violation of a constitutional right, grant an appropriate remedy, private law must be 
revised to provide a remedy as needed. This model is said to differ, first, from traditional indirect application 
model, which would lead to a denial of remedy in those cases in which private law does not always already con-
tain the legal tools and institutions for the absorption of constitutional values; second, it differs from the “direct 
application” model in that it does not ignore existing private law and does not “create a type of ‘constitutional 
private law’ that exists alongside regular private law.” But in the end, Barak, too, has to acknowledge, and ex-
plicitly does so, that “[w]here the right is recognized (in public law), the remedy must also be recognized (in 
private law): ubi ius, ibi remedium.”
21 
 
Notice that the debate on the constitutionalization of private law reverberates the broader debate on the 
possibility of content-independent conceptions of constitutional bindingness. Consider, on the one hand, a diffi-
culty with H.L.A. Hart’s claim that “the existence and content of the law can be identified by reference to the 
social sources of the law (e.g. legislation, judicial decisions, social customs) without reference to morality except 
where the law thus identified has itself incorporated moral criteria for the identification of law.”
22 According to 
this thesis, substantive legal argument is normative only insofar as “the social sources of the law” make moral 
standards part of the law. One of Hart’s underlying concerns is “the degree or extent of uncertainty which a legal 
system can tolerate if it is to make any significant advance from a decentralized regime of custom-type rules in 
providing generally reliable and determinate guides to conduct identifiable in advance.”
23 Against Dworkin’s ob-
jection that legal argument is “characteristically and pervasively moral argument,” because “[l]awyers must de-
cide which of competing sets of principles provide the best – morally most compelling – justification of legal 
                                                           
18 If there’d be a world without principles and constitutional values, we still could, in such a world, have an internally coherent private 
law system, according to the approach I am describing here. 
19 Barak, op. cit. 30. 
20 Idem, 29. 
21 Barak, op. cit, at 31. But notice also his retractation in the somewhat dark formulation, at p. 29: “Private law is the expression of re-
strictions placed on human rights to realize human rights while safeguarding public interest.” 
22 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, 1997, 2
nd Ed.), p. 269 
23 Ibid., at 252.   8
practice as a whole.”
24 Hart upholds the claim that we can talk about law in a pre-interpretive sense and that “the 
law may be identified without reference to morality.”
25 But for those who think that a constitution can’t be 
binding on its addressees for any other reason than the acceptability of its provisions, content-independence 
remains a puzzle. Consider, on the other hand, the complementary difficulty with Dworkin’s claim that in order 
to “translate” the abstract intentions of the constitutional legislator “we rely on personification”
26 – that is, on a 
constraint-providing “communal” (and not a “statistical”) conception of ourselves acting collectively. If a “com-
munal” conception is one in which self-government is premised on certain the morality of self-respect insuring 
features of the constitution, then it is in virtue of these presuppositional features, not of “personification,” that 
constitutional provisions (and their applications) are binding.
27 Personification – the idea of a political commu-
nity personified – can’t have the foundational status which the formula that “we rely on personification” sug-
gests it has. 
 
To conclude: the vocabulary of Drittwirkung, indirect application, horizontal effect and incorporation is 
inadequate and seriously misleading. It is inadequate because whether or not, say, your freedom of expression 
mandates a specific reading of my property rights is itself a substantive moral claim, to be decided on the merits. 
We may hope to find, over the course of time, some doctrinal rules of mid-level generality which give us a prae-
sumptio iuris, a rule of thumb, as to how to deal with future cases – and then call these presumptions “private 
law.” But these private law rules can’t conceivably take on an archimedian role; they can’t be sealed-off (or can-
onized) against the practice of interpretive holism – of working out conceptions of the values in play each in the 
light of the others.
28 Second, the vocabulary of Drittwirkung etc. is seriously misleading because it suggests that 
those other values (such as freedom of speech) in the light of which we have to read the values I may want to 
protect through private law remedies (such as my property right, in the example) actually decrease my initial 
liberty. Such a view is plainly question-begging, because the meaning and scope of liberty- (or integrity-) 
interests can’t be fixed in a merely conceptual or descriptive way (as, say, part of a neutral and disengaged first-
order discourse), but can only be the outcome of a normative interpretive judgment. 
 
III. Is Talk of Constitutional Values (other than Property Rights) "Ontologically Queer"? The Case of 
Appleby and Others v. UK 
 
I must now connect the critique of constitutional method with the substantive issue I mentioned at the 
beginning, the concern that the effect of privatization is to “remove” or to “withdraw” constitutionally relevant 
matters – challenges to protected interests by power – from the purview of constitutional law. Assume that a cru-
cial function of constitutional law is to provide legitimacy to coercive political and legal orders:  
 
“Our exercise of political power” – according to Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy – “is fully proper 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason.”
29 
 
                                                           
24 Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy” (Ms. 2001). 
25 Hart, op. cit., at 270. The backbone of his argument is that “legal systems however evil are law in a preinterpretive sense” (such as 
Nazi law). Against Dworkin he argues that “principles” (considered necessary both to identify and to justify law) may be simply “iniqui-
tous” and as such carry no justifying force. Dworkin’s rejoinder, of course, is that interpretation itself is a practice shot through with 
(moral) value. 
26 Dworkin, “Comment,” in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, p. 117. Cf. also Law’s Empire, at 225. 
27 Cf. Michelman, “The Constitution as a Legitimation Contract” (Ms.); but see also, to the same effect, O. Gerstenberg/Ch. F. Sabel, 
“Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy as an Institutional Ideal for Europe?” In: Joerges/Dehousse, eds., Good Governance in Europe’s Inte-
grated Market (Oxford UP 2002), p. 289 ff. 
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29 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137 (Columbia 1996).   9
The concern, then, is that through the trend towards privatization, constitutional questions (for example, 
regarding the meaning, content, importance and scope of expressive liberties) are withdrawn from the agenda of 
the legitimacy-conferring process of constitutional justification; that, in other words, the privatization-induced 
expansion of the scope of property rights inappropriately or problematically diminishes and narrows the scope of 
public constitutional justification. Property rights, in this scenario, would operate as gag-rules that restrict from 
without the process of constitutional justification. Ultimately, privatization would marginalize the constitution, 
and change our sense of interdependence in society: of the collective conversation about what we owe one an-
other as a matter of justice and fairness.
30 
 
Consider now, against the background of this scenario, the competing argumentative strands in Appleby:  
 
In Appleby, the applicants’ first line of argument rested on the premise that there are limits to the extent 
to which the state may escape constitutional constraints through “delegation” to private actors of “public func-
tions.” The applicants pointed out that it was a public entity that had built the area in question (the “Galleries”) 
on public land and a government minister who approved the transfer to private ownership. Therefore, so the ar-
gument ran, the State (the UK) could be held directly responsible for the interference with their freedom of 
expression and assembly flowing from Art. 10 and 11 of the Convention. The applicants’ second line of argu-
ment focused on the intrinsic value of freedom of expression – and on the failure of the state to act in the face of 
an (alleged) undermining of that value. The applicants argued that, as the ideas which they wished to communi-
cate were of a political nature, their expression was entitled to the highest level of protection. Access to the Gal-
leries was essential for the exercise of those rights, as it was the most effective way of reaching the audience, as 
was shown by the fact that the local authority itself used the Galleries to advocate political proposals. The State 
is – according to the plaintiffs – under the obligation to put in place, through carefully drafted legislation, “a 
legal framework which provided effective protection for their rights of freedom of expression and peaceful as-
sembly by balancing those rights against the rights of the property owner as already existed in a number of ar-
eas.” Such legislation would have to be built around notions of “‘quasi-public’-land” (in order to deal with diffi-
culties which would ensue if places open to the public, such as theatres or museums, were required to permit 
freedom of access for purposes other than the cultural activities on offer) and of “reasonable access” (with regard 
to shopping malls and university campuses) in order to give “an indication of how the State could approach the 
perceived problems.” 
 
The British Government challenged both lines of argument. It claimed that it could not be regarded “as 
bearing direct responsibility for any interference with the applicants’ exercise of their rights,” as “it was the pri-
vate company, in the exercise of [its] rights as property owner, which refused the applicants’ permission to use 
the ‘Galleries’ for their activities.” While the British Government admitted that “positive obligations” were, in 
principle, capable of arising under Articles 10 and 11, such obligations did not arise in casu, because “[t]he al-
leged breach did not have a serious impact on the applicants who had many other opportunities to exercise their 
rights and used them to obtain thousands of signatures as a result.” Between the property rights of the mall own-
ers and the applicants’ expressive liberty, a fair balance had been struck, because “means to exercise those rights 
[of expression and assembly] were widely available on genuinely public land and in the media.” Second, the 
British Government made the claim that it is not “for the Court to prescribe the necessary content of domestic 
law by imposing some ill-defined concept of ‘quasi-public’ land to which a test of reasonable access could be 
applied.”  
 
The Court’s own asseessment, adopted by six votes to one, essentially confirmed the British Govern-
ment’s line of argument; the British Government had not, according to the Court, failed in any positive obliga-
tion to protect the applicants’ freedom of expression in not securing the applicants’ access to the area in ques-
tion. The Court was unpersuaded by the claim that the Government bears a “direct responsibility” for the appli-
cants’ restriction of freedom of expression because a public development corporation had transferred the prop-
                                                           
30 Mark H. Moore, “Introduction to Symposium: Public Values in an Era of Privatisation,” 116 Harvard Law Review, 1212, at 1217 
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erty to a private company. The Court concentrated entirely on the question “whether the Government have failed 
in any positive obligation to protect the exercise of the applicants’ Art. 10 rights from interference by […] the 
owner of the Galleries.” The rationale of the Court’s decision was that the “provision [of Art. 10], notwithstand-
ing the acknowledged importance of freedom of expression, does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exer-
cise of that right.” The Court added, with regard to the applicants’ argument that shopping centers are designed 
increasingly to serve as “public” gathering places, that such changes in the “ways in which people move around 
and come into contact with each other” do not require “the automatic creation of rights into private property.” 
The only limit would be, according to the Court, a constellation such as the one decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Marsh v. Alabama where the entire municipality was controlled by a private body and “the essence of 
the right had been destroyed.”  
 
What the Court in Appleby did acknowledge was that this freedom of expression is among “the precondi-
tions for a functioning democracy” and that “[g]enuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend mere-
ly on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of rela-
tions between individuals.”
31 But at the same time the Court considered itself in a position to make far-reaching 
and complex factual and normative assessments concerning the “effective exercise of freedom of expression”
32: 
The applicants, the Court said, could “employ alternative means, such as calling door-to-door or seeking ex-
posure in the local press, radio, television” or “distributing their leaflets on the public access paths into the area.” 
At several occasions, as the Court points out, the applicants had been able to obtain individual permission from 
businesses within the area known as “the Galleries.” The applicants were therefore, according to the Court, not 
“effectively prevented from communicating their views to their fellow citizens.” As the Court emphasized, some 
3,200 people had submitted letters in support of the cause pursued by the applicants. “Whether more would have 
done so if the [applicants’] stand had remained in the Gallerie” – the Court states – “is speculation which is in-
sufficient to support an argument that the applicants were unable otherwise to exercise their freedom of expres-
sion in a meaningful manner.”
33 
 
Of course, at this point the concern I mentioned at the beginning with constitutional evacuation – raised 
in a dissenting opinion by Judge Maruste – is back with us: in a historical context in which many traditionally 
state-owned services such as post, transport, energy, health and community services, etc. have been, or stand to 
be, privatized, should, Maruste asks, private owners’ property rights prevail over “other rights” or “does the 
State retain its responsibility to secure the right balance between private and public interests?” Maruste argued 
that in Appleby the privatized area in its “functional nature” remained a forum publicum, and was intended to be 
used, by the applicants, as a forum to discuss publicly a topic of public, not private, nature and thus to contribute 
to the debate about the exercise of local government powers. Maruste, thus, puts to the foreground the agent’s 
liberty interest protected by freedom of expression and, from an interest-sensitive standpoint, argues that “it 
cannot be the case that through privatisation the public authorities can divest themselves of any responsibility to 
protect rights and freedoms other than property rights.” Public authorities continue to bear responsibility for 
deciding how the forum created by them is to be used and for ensuring that public interests and individuals’ 
rights are respected. “The public authorities did not carry out a balancing exercise and did not regulate how the 
privately-owned forum publicum was to be used in the public interest.” The Chamber’s majority opinion thus 
failed to understand that “[t]he old traditional rule that the private owner has an unfettered right to eject people 
from his land and premises without giving any justification and without any test of reasonableness being applied 
is no longer fully adapted to contemporary conditions of society.” 
 
As Judge Maruste’s dissenting opinion illustrates, it remains a fair and obvious question why the Court 
concluded that the British Government was not under an obligation to secure the exercise of the applicants’ com-
municative interests within the privatized town center and to develop the domestic property law in the light of 
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the importance of Art. 10 ECHR—in other words, why the Court held there was no “protective function” of the 
State corresponding to the applicants’ freedom of expression. 
 
As I mentioned, the Court’s majority opinion concluded that Art. 10 ECHR, despite the importance of 
freedom of expression in a “functioning democracy,” does not bestow any freedom of forum for the exercise of 
that right; and to support this conclusion the Court pointed to the availability of what it took to be alternative 
channels of effective political communication outside the town center. But this reasoning betrays a partisan and 
narrow conception of the value of political speech – indeed, it betrays a non-engagement by the Court with the 
question exactly why freedom of speech is important in a functioning democracy. The Court never addressed the 
liberty interest the applicants had for considering it so important to communicate with their fellow citizens 
within the town center (as opposed to communication through “alternative channels”); the Court never explored 
the connection between political speech and the role of a town center as an institutional setting; and the Court 
never explored the idea that the fair value of the right to political speech always depends on the availability of 
resources which, under conditions of privatization, can become scarce and precarious. Freedom of speech is 
usually associated with a plethora of values, such as the discovery of truth, individual self-expression, a well-
functioning democracy (Meiklejohn’s “thinking-process of the community”
34), the possibility of social change, 
etc.
35 Suppose now that we value freedom of expression not merely in terms of the chance of “getting through” 
our messages, but in terms of the likelihood of the coming into existence of a process of citizens reasoning to-
gether about the common good – a process which is governed by a requirement of equality among the partici-
pants and in which citizens can understand themselves mutually as partners in a shared deliberative practice. The 
first understanding – call it the “aggregative” approach – abandons the idea of a truth-orientation of political 
speech and focuses entirely on whether communications have had a fair competitive chance (compared to some 
benchmark) of receiving their addressees’ attention – of getting heard. The second understanding, by contrast, 
focuses on the process of argumentative exchange and critical encounter between citizens with diverging stand-
points – and, contrary to the aggregative approach, is concerned with the institutional presuppositions of such an 
undistorted communicative process. The aggregative approach cannot tell us what is good about political speech 
and why it is inherently valuable (apart from getting one’s messages through to others). By contrast, a “delibera-
tive” view of political speech envisages political speech as a process in which citizens under conditions of rea-
sonable disagreement can (i) engage in a process of civic conversation over how, with regard to some conten-
tious issue, “society as a fair system of cooperation over time”
36 is possible and over what the mutually shared 
terms of cooperations, from case to case, should be, and can (ii) thereby recognize each other as equals. Pro-
ceeding from the baseline of a deliberative approach (the point of which is to shed light on the institutional pre-
requisits of a successful argumentative practice), the notion of a “quasi-public forum” loses its appearance of 
ontological queerness which it seemed to have under the aggregative approach; the idea of a quasi-public forum 
(I am dropping the quotation marks now) simply points out that critical encounters between citizens – the dia-
logical to-and-fro of competing arguments, of speech and counterspeech, the fallibilistic self-exposure to larger 
and larger and increasingly diverse audiences – needs an institutional site or arena where it can unfold; that the 
town center is paradigmatically such a site or arena; and that under certain circumstances – those of privatization 
– critical encounter (preconditional to a “functioning democracy”) can’t unfold without some help from the state 
and the legal system. 
 
Suppose, then, that the Court, in deciding not to address free speech issues from an internal standpoint, 
was under the sway of the British Government’s contention that “it [is] not for the Court to prescribe the neces-
sary content of domestic law by imposing some ill-defined concept of ‛quasi-public’ land to which a test of rea-
sonableness should be applied,” and that the Court out of skepticism with regard to the “cognizability” of the 
notion of a “quasi-public forum” willy-nilly felt “thrown back” to an emphasis on the property rights of the 
owner of the “Galleries” as an epistemologically safe harbor, as it were. Let’s – somewhat speculatively, I admit 
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– assume that the Court was aware of a phenomenon F. Schauer recently identified as “opportunism” with regard 
to freedom of speech, “First Amendment Opportunism,” for short. The idea is that all kinds of claims – political, 
cultural, ideological, economic and moral claims that are far wider than the First Amendment, and that appear to 
have no special affinity to it, find themselves transmogrified into the political and rhetorical high ground of First 
Amendment arguments.
37 Opportunism – hovering precariously between the pejorative and the complimentary – 
is made possible by the “rule-based” view that there is some “situationally antecedent core of the First Amend-
ment,” an “essence” that “precedes application” and that is something “other than the circumstances in which 
First Amendment arguments may assist one another.”
38 First amendment opportunism can be contrasted, as 
Schauer says, to the incrementalistic method of common-law decision making, in which the role played by an 
antecedent essence of ideas is minimal. Maybe, then, the ECHR’s true message in Appleby is that the issues of 
privatization and of state sovereignty should be made to “migrate” into the contentious domain of pervasively (if 
you like, “essentially”) controversial freedom of speech issues – given the availability to the applicants of other 
means of communication. The decision’s emphasis on property rights would, thus, be meant to serve irenic pur-
poses – i.e. operate as a method of avoidance – under conditions of pervasive reasonable disagreement over the 
proper value and scope of freedom of expression.  
 
But property rights aren’t absolutes; if First Amendment opportunism is a problem, then “property 
rights” opportunism is one, too. Property rights don’t settle the question of how to understand freedom of expres-
sion, because what counts, in a specific fact-situation, as a legitimate property interest, can only be the outcome 
(and not the premise) of an argument which takes into account the role and the importance of other protected in-
terests, such as the interest in freedom of expression. In Marsh v. Alabama – a case to which the ECHR explicitly 
refers – Justice Black, writing for the majority, developed the idea that “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, 
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”
39 Add to this the observation by Justice Marshall in his con-
curring opinion in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins at al.: to suggest that common-law rights (such as those 
involved in the common law of trespass) are not subject to revision by the State (or the Federal Government) 
would represent a return to Lochner – would “freeze the common law as it has been constructed by the courts 
[…] would allow no room for change in response to changes in circumstance.” But, on the other hand, the sug-
gestion is not – as Marshall emphasizes – that property rights are defined solely by state law or “that there is no 
federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common law rights by Congress or a state government […] The 
constitutional terms ‛life, liberty and property’ do not derive their meaning solely from the provisions of positive 
law [but] […] have a normative dimension as well.  
 
My point here is that once we recognize that property rights aren’t absolutes—aren’t Lochner-like 
conversation-stoppers –, then we (including the courts) can’t avoid engaging in controversy over the question 
why freedom of speech is of value and what good is its point or purpose. Only according to a libertarian ap-
proach do property rights retain an epistemological status of “firstness” in the sense that they are thought to pre-
exist constitutional provisions and provide a pre-interpretive standard against which to assess constitutional prac-
tice. While the libertarian view of property rights is said to flow from skepticism with regard to the very possi-
bility of practical reason (and the “cognizability” of notions such as fairness
40), my argument here has been, 
first, that property rights are the consequence, not the foundation, of the justice of economic institutions;
41 they 
are a consequence of legal norms designed to promote other values, such as welfare or secure contractual expec-
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tations; they are conventional in this sense that they depend on the legal system.
42 Secondly, my argument here is 
that ongoing and, in this sense, “undecidable,”
43 controversy over rights and over what Rawls has called their 
“fair value” – such as, in casu, of expressive liberties—is not a threat to the legal system, i.e., something to be 
contained (and to be controlled from without) by recourse to conventionalism, but constitutive of the legal 
system. If legal argument is characteristically and pervasively moral argument, then the “point” and “binding-
ness” of a legal system are less well captured by the idea of a “distancing device”
44 with regard to controversy – 
to be brought into play once moral resources have been exhausted –, but rather by its capacity for “reflexivity” in 
the sense that law provides both a framework and a trigger for debate (e.g. over the scope of the interests pro-
tected by freedom of expression) under conditions of irresolvable reasonable interpretive disagreement – debate 
which is itself “jurisgenerative”and lawmaking.  
 
Now, I am offering these observations not in order to replace conventionalism with some idealistic-
unworldly moral and rhetorical high-ground, but simply to make plausible why – given the twin pitfalls of “op-
portunistic” essentialism and conventionalism (or pragmatism) – rights-talk is likely to continue to play a role: to 
invoke a right is the way of bringing dialogue and controversy back into exclusory, entrenched and marginaliz-
ing social settings; “rights,” then, are argumentative vehicles for publicly expressing demands for equality of 
attention and recognition – and for thereby uno actu bringing about a public sphere in which controversy can un-
fold. As Martha Minow nicely puts it, the language of rights is nuanced enough to express, ‛I am connected to 
you in my very willingness to observe your boundaries,’ or ‛I do not belong to your community, but I lay claim 
to some shared terms in demanding that you respect my separateness.’
45 Rights, then, are devices for joining dis-
cussion; they affirm a commitment to live together under mutually shared and acceptable terms of cooperation; 
rather than merely being devices of privatization of value judgments – of boundary-drawing to set us apart –, 
their “dialectics” is that they, once invoked, have the force to bring about an agenda and a forum that parties to a 
conflict cannot avoid (as part of their commitment to reasonable disagreement and commitment to understand-
ing themselves mutually as “parties to a conflict” at all – rather than reacting to conflict either by walking away 
[exit]
46 or by resorting to murder), and that is in this unreduceable (and irenic) sense public.
47 (Full privatization 
of value determinations – in other words, elevation of property rights into a kind of grundnorm from which to 
judge all the rest of the norms – would have something dehumanizing in that it would deny the possibility of 
moral perception.) 
 
IV. Comparative Constitutionalism: A Guide of the Perplexed? 
 
If these arguments about property and freedom of speech are so easily available “to us” (and there was 
nothing original in what I have said), why, then, were they not available to the Court? Assume that one possible 
(if somewhat charitable) explanation is this: that the Court’s obéissance to the British Government’s hard-nosed 
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claim was due to intimidation, to which the Court was particulary vulnerable as a supranational human-rights 
court, and that the Court’s vulnerability to intimidation, in turn, has to do with the absence (or, at least, structural 
weakness) of a Convention-wide “constitutional patriotism” as a formative context
48 or empirical contingency
49 
underlying the constitutionalist justification of politics. 
 
To what extent, then, might we say that constitutional interpretation does not simply rely on constitu-
tional patriotism as a premise, but no less supports its emergence and can, by way of non-tautological circularity, 
bring it about?
50 Moral perception, tolerance for conflict, willingness to make yourself vulnerable, etc. always 
depend on a motivational (or ethical) endorsement of the idea of dialogic self-exposure to others, and a confi-
dence that if I do so, you will in all likelihood reciprocate – anticipating that I will do the same; call this action-
enabling web or chain of mutual reciprocity-anticipations “constitutional patriotism,” “democratic partnership,” 
or “public reason.”
51 To what extent can “comparative constitutionalism” become an engine of a more denation-
alized, more inter-translatable, more validity-oriented – and, at the same time, more context-sensitive and in-
clusory constitutional patriotism? To what extent could the workings of “comparative constitutionalism,” if 
suitably routinized within our local adjudicative practices, offer a safeguard against false insularity – against the 
legal system lapsing (back) into the “wrong” kind of justificatory closure? 
 
Consider, to begin with, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s contention that, to the extent to which we focus on 
law’s “persuasive authority” (as opposed to questions of mere pedigree), this comparative dimension, becomes 
constitutive of legal justification (rather than remaining marginal and supplementary to it) – and, as she says, a 
“family affair.”
52 What she observes is an “underlying shift from two systems – international and domestic – to 
one; from international and national judges to judges applying international law, national law, or a mixture of 
both.” The focus, she says, “shifts from the dispute resolvers to the disputes themselves, and to the common val-
ues that all judges share in guaranteeing litigant rights and safeguarding an efficient and effective system.”
53 
This shift of focus and perspective will raise tolerance for conflict, since judges now understand each other not 
as a group of strangers (bound together by norms of politeness), but as contenders in a “common judicial enter-
prise,” with “deep respect for each other’s competences,” and “driven by the expression of a deeper common 
identity.” In a similar vein, Frank Michelman says, against the background of U.S. constitutionalism, that break-
ing away from “exceptionalism” is “‛only’ […] about joining discussion”– “[…] about plugging American de-
bates about the basic rights of people here, under our practices and laws, into a parallel global conversation.”
54 
Entering full-scale into “open, visible, robust colloquy with transnational discourse of human rights” would not 
diminish, but strengthen domestic law’s integrity by roping domestic judges into the discipline of justifying their 
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53 P. 218. 
54 Frank Michelman, “Integrity-Anxiety” (manuscript, Carr Center, 2002).   15
takes on specific problems before the forum of an emergent world legal opinion (thus, “integrity-anxiety” and 
domestic lawyers’ concern with losing control are unfounded); indeed, joining discussion could become a cata-
lyst for an “emergent … world legal opinion,” a “speculation” he calls “utopian, and Habermasian.” 
 
Let me, then, call it universalistic and pragmatic
55: underlying this “speculation” is the idea that we can-
not know what a constitutional norm means until we apply it; that to apply an (open-ended constitutional) norm 
always involves critical self-exposure by the interpreter to an ever widening and increasingly diverse audience of 
other interlocutors/interpreters to mutual criticism and dialogue across the boundaries of your “self” and of your 
"vocabulary”; in other words, that presuppositional to successful constitutional-norm interpretation are notions 
of justifiability (meanings and justifications can be shared, however fallibilistically, across contexts) and of mu-
tual recognition as equals (common membership to a consensus) – notions which account for the orientation to-
wards both widening and ever more heterogenous audiences. (Think here, if you like, of Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument.
56) Comparative constitutionalism, then, from the vantage-point of this “speculation,” is not 
external to (and not a threat to), but an internal or endemic to the very concept of constitutional-norm applica-
tion.  
 
Of course, the “speculation” (into which I am joining here) always comes with a sting
57: the risk of end-
ing up trading one kind of closure (or “bad coherence”) against another one – the self-conscious, exceptionalistic 
closure of the domestic national legalism against the new systems-theoretical closure of legal discourse and of 
legal professionalism (“Juristenrecht”). The sting is that of too much “family” or “familiarity,” of too much judi-
cial (and professional and professorial) comity and complicity; and ultimately, of law turning into an autopoieti-
cally closed, self-referential, self-programming subsystem among others, hived-off – and estranged from – “pro-
fane” political contention and input; and, ultimately and somewhat paradoxically, of the rationalizing legalist-
formalist dream (and the separability-thesis) having a strange “re-entry” under conditions of legal globaliza-
tion.
58 
 
Now, I am pointing at this sting not in order to discredit the universalistic-pragmatic aspiration behind 
the notion of “persuasive authority.” Comparative constitutionalism, rather than contracting and receding into a 
purely jurists’ law, can become a vehicle for widening (and deepening) the pool of (constitutional) arguments 
available; and of shifting the burden of proof on those who proclaim to have reasons to depart from a shared 
understanding. In casu, a more straightforward and constitutionally adequate course for the ECtHR would have 
been to insist on the centrality of town centers for a functioning democracy especially in a context of ongoing 
privatization – and to leave the more detailed policy-balancing between norm and exception to the British legis-
lative process. 
 
V. Brief Conclusion 
 
What remains puzzling in the Appleby-case I reported here, then, is the Court’s complete indifference, 
despite its many comparative references to “foreign” case law, to why freedom of political speech is so important 
and how mutual persuasion depends on a structure and climate that encourages attention to the merits of what 
others say. But maybe this absence just faithfully mirrors a reality of new European governance. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
55 I am, of course, aware of the allusion to Habermas’s and Apel’s concept of “Universalpragmatik” (perhaps not fully adequately ren-
dered by “universal pragmatics”). 
56 Cf. Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Harvard UP, 2002); and also his earlier work, in par-
ticular, Reason, Truth, and History (1981). 
57 Cf. also R. Unger's notion of the “dirty little secret of jurisprudence,” in: What Should Legal Analysis Become? P. 72 f. (Verso 1996). 
58 Cf. also the “short list” of “some of the questions” pulled together by David Kennedy, “Boundaries in the Fields of Human Rights: The 
International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?” In: 15 Harvard Human Rights J'l, 101 ff. (2002). 